

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3863

To provide a strategic approach to the war in Iraq to enhance the national security interests of the United States both at home and abroad, while ensuring the safety of the United States Armed Forces and ensuring stability in Iraq and the Middle East.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 17, 2007

Mr. SESTAK introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To provide a strategic approach to the war in Iraq to enhance the national security interests of the United States both at home and abroad, while ensuring the safety of the United States Armed Forces and ensuring stability in Iraq and the Middle East.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Enhancing America’s
5 Security through Strategic Redeployment from Iraq Act”.

1 **SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.**

2 (a) FIRST PRINCIPAL FINDING.—Ending the war in
3 Iraq is necessary, however, how the war is ended is of even
4 greater importance for United States national security,
5 the safety of members of the United States Armed Forces
6 currently serving in Iraq, and stability in both Iraq and
7 the Middle East.

8 (b) SECOND PRINCIPAL FINDING.—

9 (1) OPEN-ENDED COMMITMENT IS
10 UNSUSTAINABLE.—An open-ended United States in-
11 volvement in Iraq is not in the interest of United
12 States national security, and United States military
13 forces must be redeployed or risk becoming severely
14 over-strained.

15 (2) SUPPORTING FACTS.—

16 (A) Currently, 40 percent of all United
17 States Army equipment is in Iraq.

18 (B) There is no Army unit currently in the
19 United States in a state of readiness that would
20 permit the unit to deploy anywhere another
21 contingency might occur in the world.

22 (c) THIRD PRINCIPAL FINDING.—

23 (1) LENGTHY REDEPLOYMENT PROCESS.—Re-
24 deployment from Iraq will be a lengthy process.

25 (2) SUPPORTING FACTS.—

1 (A) Redeploying approximately 160,000
2 troops and 50,000 civilian contractors from
3 Iraq and closing bases are logistically chal-
4 lenging, especially during conflict.

5 (B) The critical consideration is the clo-
6 sure or turnover of the sixty-five Forward Oper-
7 ating Bases held by the United States Armed
8 Forces in Iraq.

9 (C) It takes on average 100 days to close
10 just one Forward Operating Base, and any de-
11 cision regarding the number of Forward Oper-
12 ating Bases to close at one time depends on
13 surrounding strife and the fact that receiving
14 facilities in Kuwait to prepare military vehicles
15 for shipment to the United States or elsewhere
16 can handle only 2 to 2½ brigade combat teams
17 at a time and there are currently 40 brigade
18 combat teams or their equivalent in Iraq.

19 (D) Redeployment is the most vulnerable
20 of military operations, particularly in this case
21 because redeployment will rely on a single road,
22 leading from Iraq to Kuwait.

23 (E) For comparison purposes, the removal
24 of 6,300 members of the Armed Forces from
25 Somalia in 1993 took six months and actually

1 required the deployment of another 19,000
2 troops to protect their withdrawal.

3 (F) In view of the logistical challenges, it
4 will take at least a year, more likely 15 to 20
5 months to complete redeployment of United
6 States forces from Iraq.

7 **SEC. 3. DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.**

8 (a) FIRST DECLARATION OF POLICY.—

9 (1) NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SE-
10 CURITY PLAN.—Congress declares that it is critical
11 that a comprehensive security plan is developed for
12 Iraq and the region that accepts the necessity for a
13 deliberate redeployment of United States forces from
14 Iraq.

15 (2) SUPPORTING DETAILS.—

16 (A) A comprehensive security plan is nec-
17 essary for both the safety of United States
18 forces in Iraq and the overall national security
19 of the United States.

20 (B) Redeployment would allow large num-
21 bers of members of the United States Armed
22 Forces to return to the United States, while
23 some forces could be deployed to areas, such as
24 Afghanistan, where terrorists pose a threat to
25 the national security of the United States or

1 could remain at existing bases in Kuwait, Bah-
2 rain, the United Arab Emirates, or Qatar and
3 on aircraft carrier and amphibious groups, to
4 protect United States interests in the region.

5 (b) SECOND DECLARATION OF POLICY.—

6 (1) IRAQI ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY.—

7 Congress declares that a planned end to United
8 States involvement in Iraq will serve to force Iraqi
9 leaders to assume responsibility for the security and
10 governance of their country while providing Iran and
11 Syria the incentive to prevent violence otherwise
12 caused by the redeployment of United States forces.

13 (2) SUPPORTING DETAILS.—

14 (A) The United States intelligence commu-
15 nity has found that Iran and Syria, currently
16 involved destructively in the fighting in Iraq
17 want stability in Iraq following redeployment,
18 and can play a constructive role in improving
19 security and stability in Iraq.

20 (B) Because the redeployment of United
21 States may take up to 20 months, there is an
22 opportunity for a strategic approach to work
23 diplomatically for political accommodation in
24 Iraq with Iran and Syria (as well as Saudi Ara-

1 bia and other countries in the region) during
2 that timeframe.

3 (c) **THIRD DECLARATION OF POLICY.**—Congress de-
4 clares that while a “date certain” deadline for the rede-
5 ployment of United States forces could force Iraqi leaders
6 to assume responsibility and provide Iran and Syria the
7 incentive to prevent violence that could result from the re-
8 deployment, a “goal” for the redeployment’s end instead
9 of a “date certain” is a necessary compromise in order
10 to ensure a strategic approach for United States security
11 and create a greater level of Iraqi stability in the after-
12 math of the redeployment.

13 **SEC. 4. REDEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS.**

14 (a) **REDEPLOYMENT REQUIRED.**—

15 (1) **REQUIREMENT.**—Redeployment of United
16 States Armed Forces serving in Iraq as part of Op-
17 eration Iraqi Freedom shall begin within three
18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act.
19 Within six months after the date of the enactment
20 of this Act, troop levels shall be at least 15,000
21 below the pre-surge level of 130,000 troops.

22 (2) **GOAL.**—Except as provided in subsection
23 (b), not later than twenty months after the date of
24 the enactment of this Act, the goal is that all United
25 States Armed Forces serving in Iraq as part of Op-

1 eration Iraqi Freedom shall be deployed outside of
2 Iraq, to locations within the Middle East or South-
3 west Asia regions or to other regions or nations, or
4 returned to the United States.

5 (3) PURPOSE AND PACE OF REDEPLOYMENT.—

6 The redeployment required by this subsection shall
7 be carried out for the purposes of both enhancing
8 global security interests of the United States and
9 improving the military readiness of the United
10 States. The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that
11 the redeployment is carried out at a deliberate, or-
12 derly pace that allows for the full security of mem-
13 bers of the Armed Services.

14 (b) EXCEPTIONS TO REDEPLOYMENT REQUIRE-

15 MENT.—The redeployment required by subsection (a)
16 shall not apply to the following:

17 (1) SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND

18 COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS.—Special oper-
19 ations forces assigned outside of Iraq that conduct
20 either targeted counter-terrorism operations or peri-
21 odic support operations of the Iraqi security forces
22 in Iraq.

23 (2) MILITARY LIAISON TEAMS.—Military or ci-

24 vilian personnel on military liaison teams involved in
25 military-to-military contacts and comparable activi-

1 ties between the United States and Iraq, as author-
2 ized under section 168 of title 10, United States
3 Code.

4 (3) AIR SUPPORT.—Members of the Air Force,
5 Navy, and Marine Corps assigned to locations out-
6 side Iraq for purposes of conducting air operations
7 in Iraq (including air operations in support of com-
8 bat operations) to support the Iraqi security forces.

9 (4) SECURITY FOR UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC
10 MISSIONS IN IRAQ.—Members of the Armed Forces
11 providing security for the United States Embassy
12 and other United States diplomatic missions in Iraq.

13 (5) DEFENSE ATTACHE.—Personnel conducting
14 routine functions of the Office of Defense Attache.

15 **SEC. 5. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.**

16 Effective six months after the date of the enactment
17 of this Act, funds appropriated or otherwise made avail-
18 able to the Department of Defense under any provision
19 of law for Operation Iraqi Freedom may not be obligated
20 or expended to support more than 115,000 members of
21 the United States Armed Forces within Iraq, with a goal
22 of no funding for troops in Iraq within twenty months
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act.

1 **SEC. 6. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES.**

2 (a) UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP.—The United
3 States should take a leadership role in diplomatic efforts
4 and negotiations necessary for countries in the region, in-
5 cluding Iran and Syria, to work together to ensure the
6 long-term stability of Iraq, which is in the best interests
7 of such countries and the United States.

8 (b) INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.—The United
9 States should convene an international conference to bring
10 together countries throughout the world to provide eco-
11 nomic aid for rebuilding the infrastructure of Iraq and
12 other reconstruction efforts in Iraq that are essential to
13 ensure the long-term stability of Iraq and America's na-
14 tional security.

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